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A Better Way to Approach
Privacy Policy in the United States:
Establish a Non-Regulatory Privacy
Protection Board
by
ROBERT GELLMAN*
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to argue that the United States
needs a federal privacy agency. The main objective of a privacy
agency would be to promote the adoption and implementation
throughout the United States of protections for personal privacy and
of principles of Fair Information Practices. Other functions would
include issuing advisory opinions, conducting investigations,
proposing rules and legislation, commenting on governmental and
private sector actions affecting privacy, assisting with private sector
self-regulatory efforts, and maintaining international continuity. The
agency would not have any regulatory powers. The Appendix
includes a specific legislative proposal that more fully describes the
organization, functions, and membership of the Privacy Protection
Board.
The importance of privacy as a public policy concern will be
accepted here as a given. Other sources can provide the usual
measures of importance, which include:
e the number of state and federal privacy laws enacted in the last
few years;
* the number of privacy bills introduced in state legislatures and
in Congress;
* Privacy and Information Policy Consultant, Washington, D.C.; former Chief
Counsel and Staff Director of the Subcommittee on Information, Justice, Transportation,
and Agriculture of the House Committee on Government Operations; B.A., 1970,
University of Pennsylvania; J.D., 1973, Yale Law School. I thank Harold Relyea, Paul
Schwartz, and Beryl Radin for comments on earlier drafts. Prepared for the Enforcing
Privacy Rights Symposium, November 15 & 16, 2002.
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* the degree of public concern as expressed in public opinion
polls;
* the growth of sincere and other privacy self-regulatory
activities;
e the development of public and private institutions dealing with
aspects of privacy;
* the number of lawsuits and federal and state investigations into
violations of privacy;
" the volume of media coverage of privacy;
" the consequences to individuals from the use and misuse of
personal information;
* the ever-increasing amount of personal information maintained
by third party record keepers; and
* the vast capabilities of modern information technology,
including the Internet, to collect, compile, maintain, and
disseminate personal information.'
For present purposes, it is sufficient to assert that nearly every
institution in the modern world maintains personal data and that
nearly every individual is the subject of data files maintained by those
institutions. Nowhere is this more true than in the United States,
where the collection, maintenance, use, and disclosure of personal
information is ubiquitous among private and governmental
organizations.
Where personal records exist, privacy issues necessarily follow,
even if the issues are ignored at times. Record keepers and record
subjects have-or should have-a shared interest in determining the
rules governing the collection, maintenance, use, and disclosure of
personal data. Both record keepers and record subjects share risks
and responsibilities regarding the processing of personal data. A
privacy agency would serve the interests of both record keepers and
record subjects.
1. The number of popular and scholarly writings that make these points is enormous.
Some examples include: DAVID BURNHAM, THE RISE OF THE COMPUTER STATE (1983);
ERIK LARSON, THE NAKED CONSUMER (1992); JEFFREY ROTHFEDER, PRIVACY FOR
SALE (1992); ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN'S WEB SITE (2000); SIMSON
GARFINKEL, DATABASE NATION (2000); A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?,
52 STAN. L. REV. 1461 (2000); Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records,
Privacy and the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137 (2002). For some interesting metrics
on the amount of data collection and the availability of data storage, see Latanya
Sweeney, Information Explosion, in CONFIDENTIALITY, DISCLOSURE, AND DATA
ACCESS: THEORY AND PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS FOR STATISTICAL AGENCIES (P.
Doyle ed., 2001).
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I. Some Reasons for a Privacy Agency
A. All the Other Kids Have One
The history of privacy during the past three decades is, among
other things, a history of the international acceptance of Fair
Information Practices as core information privacy principles and of
the spread of formal institutions to address privacy protection. Many
governments around the world enacted data protection laws and
established privacy agencies in response to similar concerns about the
effects of technology, commercialism, and government on personal
privacy.' The popularity of data protection institutions is based not
on mere fashion but on international recognition of a need to address
privacy issues through a formal and dedicated organization, and on a
demonstrated record of accomplishment and utility.
Modern data protection laws and data protection agencies began
in the State of Hesse in Germany in 1970.' Today, each European
Union member state has a data protection authority. So do more
than a dozen other countries, including Canada, Australia, Hong
Kong, Argentina, Thailand, and Monaco. The territories of
Guernsey, Isle of Man, and Jersey have data protection authorities,
and Canada, Australia, and Germany have provincial privacy
authorities.5 In some cases, these agencies share responsibility for
privacy and for open records laws.' For the most part, however,
responsibilities of the agencies are limited to privacy.
2. Data protection is used here interchangeably with privacy to refer broadly to
activities that involve the collection, maintenance, use, and disclosure of personal
information. Because it is not the purpose of this Article to explore the boundaries of
privacy, this definition is offered as definitive or limiting. Aspects of privacy other than
personal information fall within the zone of interest for a privacy agency. Debates over
privacy definitions and purposes are well established in privacy literature. See, e.g., Daniel
J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087 (2002); PRISCILLA M. REGAN,
LEGISLATING PRIVACY ch. 2 (1995).
3. See generally COLIN J. BENNETT, REGULATING PRIVACY: DATA PROTECTION
AND PUBLIC POLICY IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES (1992).
4. DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES 22
(1989).
5. This is not a complete list. The EU Data Protection web page maintains a list of
data protection commissioners around the world at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
internal market/en/dataprot/links.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2003).
6. Leading examples in Canada are the Information and Privacy Commissioner of
Ontario, at http://www.ipc.on.ca (last visited Feb. 26, 2003), and the British Columbia
Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner, at http://www.oipcbc.org (last visited
Feb. 26, 2003). The British Data Protection Registrar was recently transformed into the
Information Commissioner, at http://www.dataprotection.gov.uk (last visited Feb. 26,
2003), when freedom of information functions were added. Data protection offices in
some German states also have jurisdiction over access to records.
The European Union ("EU") is the world leader on data
protection and on national data protection agencies, which the EU
Data Protection Directive calls supervisory authorities! The
Directive treats supervisory authorities as an essential feature of data
protection activities, requiring each EU member state to have a
supervisory authority. Most other countries with data protection laws
have elected to follow the EU's lead and establish a national privacy
office.
The international growth of data protection agencies suggests a
broad recognition that the agencies are useful and, perhaps, essential
to the conduct of good data protection. A visit to the web pages of
many data protection authorities reveals a wealth of useful research,
policy analyses, advice, annual reports, and other materials. Some
agencies also produce formal opinions, decisions, and interpretations.
It is tempting to jump to the conclusion that the data protection
authorities must be useful or they would not have become so
established or spread so widely across the globe. That conclusion is
almost certainly correct, but it is admittedly hard to apply any metrics
in support. Evaluating a national privacy agency is not a simple task,
and evaluating many of them is even more challenging. Even the
development of criteria for measuring the effectiveness and value of
an agency would be controversial. Applying criteria across different
governments, cultures, and legal structures makes the task that much
more complex.
Academic evaluations of national data protection agencies are
scarce. The only multi-national study dates back to 1989. Professor
David Flaherty-who later became the Information and Privacy
Commissioner for British Columbia-analyzed privacy in five
countries, including the United States. Flaherty's conclusion about
the importance of data protection agencies to the conduct of data
protection is notable:
Perhaps the most important conclusion of this volume is that it is
not enough simply to pass a data protection law in order to control
surveillance; an agency charged with implementation is essential to
make the law work in practice. A statute by itself is an insufficient
countervailing force to the ideological and political pressures for
efficiency and monitoring of the population that are at work in
Western society.'
Flaherty was also realistic about the power that could be
exercised by data protection offices. He observed that, "[t]he harsh
7. Council Directive 95/46, art. 28, on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to
the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of such Data, 1995 O.J. (L
281/47), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal-market/en/dataprot/law/index.htm
(last visited Jan. 31, 2003) [hereinafter EU Data Protection Directive].
8. FLAHERTY, supra note 4, at 381.
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reality is that data protectors run the risk of being only a tiny force of
irregulars equipped with pitchforks and hoes waging battle against
large technocratic and bureaucratic forces equipped with lasers and
nuclear weapons." 9
Flaherty's assessment suggests that expectations for the
accomplishments of data protection authorities should be restrained.
Data protection agencies are not exempt from the usual factors that
affect the operations of all government agencies. Budgets, statutory
limitations, bureaucracy, questionable appointments, timidity, and
pragmatism take their toll everywhere. Privacy agencies are not a
panacea for privacy problems, but they remain useful contributors for
addressing those problems.'"
Despite the absence of any formal evaluation of data protection
agencies, most of the industrialized world has reached the conclusion
that a data protection agency can make a useful contribution to the
continuing struggle over privacy protections. The number of data
protection agencies has steadily increased over the past several
decades. No country that established a data protection agency later
abolished it.
Not only is a data protection agency almost certainly a good idea
on its own, but it may be close to a necessity today. With data
protection agencies in so many other countries, the resolution of
some international privacy matters comes principally through the
cooperation of the national privacy agencies." In essence, with the
international critical mass of data protection agencies that now exists,
a country without an agency is at a disadvantage.
9. Id. at 393.
10. Privacy agencies have their critics. Simon Davies, an internationally recognized
privacy advocate, objects that privacy officials too often dodge controversy in the name of
pragmatism. Simon Davies, Unprincipled Privacy: Why the Foundations of Data
Protection Are Failing Us, 24 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 284, 287 (2001), available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UNSWJ/2001/7.html.
In the face of such criticism, privacy officials (and their biographers) tend to
promote success stories, adopting a celebratory tone. While this is
understandable, all professions are constantly at risk of sacrificing their
responsibilities on the altar of pragmatism, and the area of privacy protection is
no exception. Privacy officials all too often abuse the trust placed in them by
dodging controversy in an effort to preserve their fiefdoms. As a consequence,
governments frequently succeed in using data protection law as a thinly veiled
mandate for surveillance.
Id. (footnote omitted).
11. The EU Directive established an advisory Working Party composed of
representatives of the national supervisory authorities. EU Data Protection Directive,
supra note 7, at art. 29. The numerous contributions of the so-called Article 29 Committee
can be found at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal-market/en/dataprot/wpdocs/index.htm
(last visited Feb. 26, 2003).
Privacy is one of many policy areas with international
dimensions. Over the years, the United States has been represented
at international data protection conferences by personnel from the
Commerce Department, State Department, Federal Trade
Commission, Office of Management and Budget, and others.
Continuity of representation by individuals or by agencies has been
rare, and the adequacy of U.S. representation has been mediocre, at
best.12
To some extent, the United States needs a data protection
agency because many other countries have agencies and because
those countries rely upon their agencies to help resolve international
privacy conflicts. Worldwide attention has made privacy a significant
concern for businesses operating internationally. The main
beneficiary of improved international representation on privacy
matters will be the record keepers-the business community-more
than American citizens and residents. Better resolution of privacy
disputes will benefit global trade and electronic commerce.
The interest in a structural response to privacy is not just
international. Flaherty's observation about the continuing need for
an agency to address privacy has been borne out by the expansion of
institutional responses to privacy matters. National governments
have not been the only organizations recognizing the need for privacy
institutions.
Federal agencies are increasingly establishing internal
organizations to address privacy concerns. The Defense Privacy
Board dates back to 1975, when the Privacy Act of 1974 became
effective, and it has continued in operation ever since with a principal
focus on implementation of the Privacy Act. 3 More recently, the
Department of Health and Human Services established a Privacy
Advocate in 1996 with a broader portfolio but fewer resources. A
few other federal agencies have also established positions or
committees to address privacy.
Perhaps the most interesting federal privacy office is the Office
of the Privacy Advocate established by the Internal Revenue Service
in 1993.'" The role of the IRS office is to ensure that the agency
12. For some of the history of the work of other federal agencies on privacy issues, see
Robert M. Gellman, Fragmented, Incomplete, and Discontinuous: The Failure of Federal
Privacy Regulatory Proposals and Institutions, 6 SoFrWARE L.J. 199 (1993) [hereinafter
Privacy Regulatory Proposals] and Priscilla M. Regan, Perspectives on Privacy: Changing
Institutional Roles and Responsibilities (1998) (unpublished paper presented at the
Information Privacy Seminar Series, Georgetown Business School).
13. See U.S. Dep't of Def., Def. Privacy Off. at http://www.defenselink.mil/privacy
(last visited Jan. 31, 2003).
14. See generally Margaret Ann Irving, Managing Information Privacy in the
Information Age, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 659 (2001).
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integrates privacy strategies into the agency's business processes. The
mandate of the office suggests recognition by IRS management that
traditional government responses to privacy are insufficient to
address the broader privacy concerns that IRS activities raise and that
often are ignored during traditional planning activities to new
technology and new ways of doing business." IRS established the
office without a legislative requirement.
The first legislative mandate for a privacy officer came in the
Homeland Security Act of 2002. The law requires the Secretary of
Homeland Security to appoint a senior official in the department to
assume primary responsibility for privacy policy. 6 Whether this
legislation will start a trend remains to be seen, but it is possible that
internal privacy officers may be created in other Cabinet level
departments.
California recently established a privacy office. 7 The Office of
Privacy Protection is part of the Department of Consumer Affairs. Its
mission is to serve as a statewide resource for consumer information
and as a source of assistance on identity theft and other privacy issues;
to assist law enforcement by providing privacy training and by helping
with investigations; to work with businesses to define and encourage
sound privacy protection practices; and to report on trends in consumer
privacy problems and issues. 8 The California office is too new for an
evaluation.'9
Even corporate America has taken up structural responses to
privacy. Some companies have established the position of Chief Privacy
Officer ("CPO") to manage privacy issues. It is difficult to estimate the
number of CPOs or evaluate their importance to the institutions that
created them. However, the voluntary establishment of formal privacy
positions in companies suggests some recognition of the continuing
15. The Privacy Act of 1974, the principal law regulating federal government records
for privacy, has been recognized as out of date for more than two decades. See, e.g., Who
Cares About Privacy? Oversight of the Privacy Act of 1974 by the Office of Management
and Budget and by the Congress: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Gov't Operations,
98th Cong. (1983); H.R. REP. No. 98-455 (1983).
16. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 222, 116 Stat. 2135, 2155
(2002).
17. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 350-52 (West Supp. 2002), available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=bpc&group=00001-
01000&file=350-352. See also Personal Information and Privacy Protection: Hearing on
S.B. 129 before the California Legislature Conference Committee, 1999-2000 Reg. Sess.
(Cal. 2000) (testimony of Robert Gellman recommending creation of a non-regulatory
privacy agency).
18. Office of Privacy Protection, at http://www.privacy.ca.gov/about.htm (last visited
Feb. 26, 2003).
19. Hawaii has had an Office of Information Practices with responsibilities for state
open records laws since 1988, at http://www.state.hi.us/oip (last visited Feb. 26, 2003). See
Uniform Information Practices Act, HAW. REV. STAT. § 92 F-11-42 (2001).
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importance of privacy management. Whether CPOs will become
permanent fixtures remains to be seen.'
More CPOs are certain to be established in 2003 in the health care
field. The federal privacy rule issued under the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act requires every covered entity" to
designate a privacy official.22 Small health care offices are likely to have
part-time privacy officials, but larger institutions may have full-time
offices.
None of the agency or company privacy offices provides an exact
parallel to the proposed Privacy Protection Board. However, the
establishment of privacy offices is recognition of the growing
importance of privacy and the need to manage personal data and
organizational responsibility.
B. The United States Establishes Agencies All the Time
The United States Government has agencies dedicated to issues
and activities of concern to the American public. The larger agencies
are familiar, but there are also small agencies that are responsible for
postal rates,23 civil rights,2" international trade,25 American battle
monuments, 26 marine mammals,27  migratory birds, 2  and arctic
research.9  Dozens of other small federal agencies, boards,
commissions, and committees address other specific issues that were
deemed of sufficient importance to warrant the establishment of a
permanent federal agency.
Most recently, in the Help America Vote Act of 2002,30 Congress
established the Election Assistance Commission to serve as a national
20. Since 1977, the German national data protection law required private bodies that
process personal data and employ at least five (the 2001 amendment changed the number
to twenty) permanent employees to have a formal data protection officer. See Act to
Amend the Federal Data Protection Act and Other Enactments §§ 4f-4g (2001) (F.R.G.),
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal-market/en/dataprot/law/del8-05-01.pdf.
21. Health care providers, health plans, and clearinghouses are covered entities under
the rule. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2002).
22. 45 C.F.R. § 164.530 (2002).
23. Postal Rate Commission, at http://prc.gov (last visited Feb. 26, 2003).
24. Commission on Civil Rights, at http://www.usccr.gov (last visited Feb. 26, 2003).
25. International Trade Commission, at http://www.usitc.gov (last visited Feb. 26,
2003).
26. American Battle Monuments Commission, at http://www.abmc.gov (last visited
Feb. 26, 2003).
27. Marine Mammal Commission, at http://www.mmc.gov (last visited Feb. 26, 2003).
28. Migratory Bird Conservation Commission, at http://realty.fws.gov/mbcc.html (last
visited Feb. 26, 2003).
29. Arctic Research Commission, at http://www.uaa.alaska.edu/enri/arcweb/
archome.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2003).
30. Pub. L. No. 107-252, §§ 201-02, 116 Stat. 1666, 1673 (2002) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 15301-545 (2002)).
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clearinghouse and resource for the compilation of information and
review of procedures for federal elections. The Commission also has
a series of substantive functions.
The point is that when independent agencies help to solve
substantive or political problems, Congress does not hesitate to create
them. Privacy is a matter of public concern at least to the same
degree as many other issues for which federal agencies have been
created in the past.
To illustrate the penchant of the federal government to establish
institutions, we can look at the relatively new area of critical
infrastructure protection. Critical infrastructure protection is a policy
and operational response to the explosion in computer
interconnectivity that has revolutionized the way that the
government, the nation, and much of the world communicate and
conduct business.3' The interconnectivity also poses enormous risks
to computer systems and to the critical operations and infrastructures
that they support, including telecommunications, power distribution,
national defense, law enforcement, and government services."
National attention to the subject of critical infrastructure was
spurred by the 1997 report of a presidential commission.3 3  In
response, President Clinton issued a presidential decision directive
calling for actions to improve federal agency security programs,
establish a partnership between the government and the private
sector, and improve the nation's ability to detect and respond to
attacks .34
A few years later, the General Accounting Office undertook a
review of the government's response. It found that at least fifty
federal organizations participate in national or multi-agency critical
31. It is interesting that with all of the attention and money focused on critical
infrastructures over the past few years, there is no commonly agreed upon definition of
critical infrastructure. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURES: WHAT MAKES AN INFRASTRUCTURE CRITICAL? 2 (Aug. 30, 2002)
at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31556.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2003):
Over the last few years, a number of documents concerned with critical
infrastructure protection have offered general definitions for critical
infrastructures and have provided short lists of which infrastructures should be
included. None of these lists or definitions would be considered definitive. The
criteria for determining what might be a critical infrastructure, and which
infrastructures thus qualify, have expanded over time.
Id.
32. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
PROTECTION, (GAO-02-474, 2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02474.pdf
[hereinafter GAO CIP].
33. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, CRITICAL
FOUNDATIONS: PROTECTING AMERICA'S INFRASTRUCTURES (1997).
34. Presidential Decision Directive No. NSC-63 (May 22, 1998) at
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-63.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2003).
infrastructure protection activities. The fifty organizations include
five advisory committees, six organizations in the Executive Office of
the President, thirty-eight executive branch organizations, and
others.35 Requested funding for critical infrastructure activities is
nearly $4 billion for 2003.36 So many organizations exist that they are
tripping over each other. GAO phrased it more diplomatically:
"[R]elationships among all organizations performing similar activities
(e.g., policy development or analysis and warning) were not
consistently established."37
Structural responses to public policy concerns happen routinely.
It is not unusual or unprecedented to establish a new agency or
independent commission with a focus on a particular set of issues.
Privacy is a subject with at least as much broad public interest and
concern as other issues that have separate agencies.
C. A U.S. Privacy Agency Has Been Repeatedly Proposed
The argument to this point is that national privacy agencies are
increasingly commonplace and useful around the world, that privacy
institutions of all stripes have been established in many different
types of organizations, and that the establishment of U.S. agencies in
response to matters of public concern is routine. It does not
necessarily follow from the establishment of so many different
privacy institutions that a national agency for privacy is needed.
This section reviews some past proposals for a privacy agency. It
is not an entirely new idea. While a privacy agency has never been
established, the idea never goes away. Many past reviews of privacy
and related issues have concluded that a privacy agency is a good
idea.
(1) Proposed Fair Information Practices
The most influential temporary privacy study commission ever
convened in the United States was an advisory committee established
in 1972 by Eliot Richardson, Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare. The Committee's 1973 report pro posed Fair Information
Practices as organizing principles for privacy.
35. GAO CIP, supra note 32, at 14.
36. Id. at 27.
37. Id. at 28.
38. SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMM'N ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS,
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE
RIGHTS OF CITIZENS (1973), available at http://aspe.os.dhhs.gov/datacncl/
1973privacy/tocprefacemembers.htm [hereinafter HEW Report]. See also infra the
discussion in Part III of Fair Information Practices.
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The Committee considered whether to recommend an
independent federal agency to regulate the use of automated personal
data systems. It is noteworthy that the Committee concluded an
agency was the "strongest" mechanism for providing privacy
safeguards. The agency might have authority to register or license the
operations of automated personal data systems. The Committee
rejected the agency idea because it lacked the necessary public
support and because regulation or licensing would be complicated
and costly.39 The Committee's preferred choice was enforcement of
privacy rights through individual court action. 0 Thirty years later, the
notion of licensing and registration of databases has largely passed
out of favor in other countries. It remains an open question whether
enforcement through private action is a viable strategy.
(2) Privacy Act of 1974
When Congress enacted the Privacy Act of 1974, the
establishment of a privacy agency was actively considered. 2 The bill
that passed the Senate included a proposal for a Privacy Protection
Commission with a primary mission to oversee federal record keeping
activities. The Commission would have been empowered to study
privacy matters affecting state and local governments and the private
sector. In addition, the Commission would have been able to assist
agencies and industries in the voluntary development of fair
information practices. A proposal to establish a federal privacy
commission as an independent agency was offered in the House, but
the amendment was defeated without a recorded vote. The
compromise between the House and Senate positions resulted in the
creation of a temporary study commission. 3
(3) Privacy Protection Study Commission
The Privacy Protection Study Commission ("PPSC"), established
as a temporary organization in the Privacy Act of 1974, issued its
report in 1977." Although better funded and staffed than the 1973
HEW Advisory Committee, the PPSC has had little long-term
39. Id. at 42-43. At the time of the Advisory Committee's report, no other country
had yet established a formal data protection authority.
40. Id. at 44.
41. See, e.g., Gellman, supra note 12, at n.71.
42. The history of consideration of a privacy agency during debates on the Privacy Act
of 1974 is set out in Gellman, supra note 12, at 203, and much of the discussion about
proposals for privacy agencies is excerpted from that article.
43. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896, 1907 (1974) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
44. PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMM'N, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN
INFORMATION SOCIETY (1977).
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significance. Although its recommendations received some attention
from Congress in the late 1970s, the PPSC's work is mostly forgotten
today.
The first of the PPSC's 177 recommendations was that the
President and Congress establish a federal entity such as a Federal
Privacy Board or other independent unit. The Board would have
been charged with four general functions:
1) to monitor and evaluate the implementation of any statutes and
regulations enacted pursuant to the Commission's
recommendations and to have the authority to formally participate
in federal administrative proceedings that are relevant to the
protection of personal privacy;
2) to research, study, and investigate areas of privacy concern;
3) to issue binding interpretative rules for use by federal agencies in
implementing the Privacy Act of 1974; and
4) to advise the President, Congress, government agencies, and
states regarding the privacy implications of proposed federal or
state statutes or regulations.
(4) Commission on Federal Paperwork
The Commission on Federal Paperwork was established by
Congress in 1975 to make recommendations to eliminate needless
paperwork while assuring that the Federal Government has the
information necessary to meet the mandate of law and operate
effectively.46 The Commission issued thirty-six reports and 770
recommendations on major program areas and government
processes. 7  One report specifically addressed privacy and
confidentiality issues."
Among other privacy recommendations, the Commission
proposed creation of a new federal agency to centralize and
coordinate existing information management functions within the
executive branch with particular focus on developing and
recommending policies and standards on information disclosure,
confidentiality, and safeguarding the security of information collected
or maintained by federal agencies." The recommendation was basedin part on the Commission's conclusions about widespread
45. Id. at 37.
46. Act of Dec. 27, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-556, 88 Stat. 1789 (1974) (establishing a
commission on federal paperwork).
47. Id. See also Privacy and Confidentiality Report and Final Recommendations of the
Commission on Federal Paperwork: Hearing before a Subcommittee of the House
Committee on Government Operations, 95th Cong. 53 (1977).
48. COMM'N ON FEDERAL PAPERWORK, CONFIDENTIALITY AND PRIVACY (1977).
49. Id. at 150.
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noncompliance with the Privacy Act of 1974. The Commission also
found that judicial review has not been a meaningful remedy.0
(5) Other Legislative Proposals
Legislative proposals for a privacy agency have been introduced
from time to time. In the 95th Congress, Representative Ed Koch-a
member of the Privacy Protection Study Commission-introduced a
bill to establish a Federal Information and Privacy Board and to
implement the other recommendations of the Commission."
Representative Silvio Conte introduced the Comprehensive Right to
Privacy Act, which included the establishment of a Federal Privacy
Board."
In the 98th Congress, Representative Glenn English, chairman of
the Subcommittee on Government Information, Justice, and
Agriculture, introduced legislation to establish a Privacy Protection
Commission. 3  In the 99th and 100th Congress, Representative
English reintroduced similar bills to establish a Data Protection
Board.54 Representative Bob Wise introduced a somewhat modified
proposal for a Data Protection Board in the 101st" and 102nd
Congress.56
The only active legislative attempt to create a permanent privacy
agency in recent years came in 1994 when Senator Paul Simon offered
an amendment establishing a Privacy Protection Commission" to a
bill amending the Fair Credit Reporting Act.58 There was only a brief
debate on the Senate floor. The floor manager of the bill opposed the
amendment largely on jurisdictional grounds. The amendment was
tabled by a vote of 77 to 21.60
50. Id. at 147.
51. H.R. 9986, 95th Cong. (1977). This bill was reintroduced in the following Congress
by Representative Barry Goldwater, Jr., the second congressional appointee to the Privacy
Protection Study Commission. H.R. 350, 96th Cong. (1979).
52. H.R. 285, 95th Cong. (1977).
53. Privacy Protection Act of 1984, H.R. 3743, 98th Cong. (1983).
54. Data Protection Act of 1985, H.R. 1721, 99th Cong. (1985); Data Protection Act of
1987, H.R. 638, 100th Cong. (1987).
55. Data Protection Act of 1989, H.R. 3669, 101st Cong. (1989). A hearing that
considered, among other issues, H.R. 3669, was held in 1990.
56. Data Protection Act of 1991, H.R. 685, 102d Cong. (1991). The bill was discussed
at data protection oversight hearings in 1991. See Domestic and International Data
Protection Issues: Hearings Before the Government Information, Justice, and Agriculture
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 102d Cong. (1991).
57. 140 CONG. REC. S5129-31 (1994).
58. See Consumer Reporting Reform Act of 1994 need cite; 140 CONG. REC. S5129
(1994).
59. Id. at S5132 (statement of Sen. Bryan).
60. Id. at S5133.
In 2000, Congress considered a proposal to establish a temporary
Commission for the Comprehensive Study of Privacy Protection. The
bill reached the House floor, where it attracted a majority. However,
the bill failed to pass because the procedure used to bring the bill to a
vote required a two-thirds majority.6' By 2000, privacy had become so
politicized that some members of Congress viewed the notion of a
study commission as an excuse not to consider substantive privacy
legislation.62
A temporary study commission and a permanent privacy agency
are significantly different institutions. A temporary commission
cannot perform most of the functions proposed for a privacy agency.
For example, the 1977 report of the temporary Privacy Protection
Study Commission was long-since forgotten by the time that privacy
became a major public policy issue in the 1990s. That report failed to
anticipate many technological and marketplace developments.
(6) Information Infrastructure Task Force & Information Policy Committee
During the Clinton Administration's second term, an
Information Infrastructure Task Force operated as a cabinet level
group chaired by the Secretary of Commerce. An Information Policy
Committee chaired by the Administrator of the Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs in the Office of Management and Budget
examined several policy options, including the creation of a privacy
entity.63  The discussion paper considered the advantages and
disadvantages of an independent regulatory agency. In the end, the
Committee did not endorse any of the options. The issue became
moot when a privacy counselor was established in the Office of
Management and Budget in March 1999. However, the OMB privacy
counselor position was abolished when the Bush Administration took
office in January 2001. 64
(7) Conclusion
A privacy agency is an idea that never developed enough support
for serious consideration. During the 1980s and most of the 1990s,
the business community was largely opposed to federal privacy
61. Privacy Comm'n Act, H.R. 4049, 106th Cong. (2000). The House voted on the bill
on October 2, 2000. 146 CONG. REC. H8588-89 (2000).
62. See, e.g., 146 CONG. REC. H8564 (2000) (remarks of Rep. Henry Waxman).
63. INFORMATION POLICY COMMITTEE, NATIONAL INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCrURE TASK FORCE, OPTIONS FOR PROMOTING PRIVACY ON THE
NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE (1997), available at
http://www.iitf.nist.gov/ipc/privacy.html.
64. See Patrick Thibodeau, Bush Makes Key Privacy Decision, COMPUTERWORLD,
Apr. 16, 2001, at 1, available at http://www.computerworld.com/securitytopics/
security/privacy/story/0,10801,59647,00.html.
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legislation of any type. When privacy received more congressional
attention in the last half of the 1990s, actions focused on more
substantive privacy legislation. While the political prospects for
privacy agency legislation remain, at best, mixed, the increased
private and governmental interest in organizational responses to
privacy make a privacy agency ripe for reconsideration. The past
opposition of the business community to privacy legislation is no
longer monolithic, and privacy matters have increased in importance
in the political and commercial marketplaces. A privacy agency,
especially a non-regulatory agency, is likely to be viewed today in a
more positive light, even by some past opponents.
III. Model for a Privacy Agency
Perhaps the best model for a privacy agency is the Civil Rights
Commission that Congress established in the Civil Rights Act of
1957.65 Some parallels between privacy and civil rights can be
identified, but it is not the similarities that make the Civil Rights
Commission a model for a privacy agency. The features of the Civil
Rights Commission that are most relevant are its independence, fact-
finding functions, limited powers, and the highly controversial subject
of its mandate.
The President appoints the members of the Commission, who
must be confirmed by the Senate. The Commission's functions are to
investigate complaints of civil rights violations, study, collect
information, make appraisals of the law and policies of the federal
government, serve as a national clearinghouse, and prepare public
service announcements.66 The Commission may also hold hearings
and issue subpoenas.67 The Commission also reports annually to the
President and to Congress.' The Commission has no authority to
regulate anyone or to enforce any law.
An independent evaluation of the Civil Rights Commission's
early years (1957-1963) contrasted the agency's limited powers with
the importance of its issues:
In comparison with these relatively weak and legalistic provisions,
the importance of the Commission lay in its future potentialities.
Empowered to assemble authentic and documented information, to
be incorporated in the public record, this new Federal agency
would be able to build up an unassailable factual record of the
65. 42 U.S.C. § 1975 (1994).
66. Id. § 1975c. Some of the Commission's functions date back to its original
legislation, Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 635 (1957). Other
functions were added by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Public Law 88-352, 78 Stat. 251
(1964).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 1975d(f).
68. Id. § 1975c(c).
status of civil rights throughout the country. From this base, it
could then point the way toward more effective policies, on the part
of both the Executive and Congress, than anything contemplated in
the existing halfway [civil rights legislation] .
A statement in support of the Commission from Attorney
General Herbert Brownell pointed out the need for a guide to a
fundamental issue of the day. "Investigations and hearings will bring
into sharper focus the area of responsibility of the Federal
Government and of the States under our constitutional system.
Through greater public understanding, therefore, the Commission
may chart a court of progress to guide us in these years ahead."7
A full evaluation of the Civil Rights Commission is far beyond
this paper. A study of the Commission's early years concluded by
noting the Commission's effectiveness in influencing congressional
and executive actions:
For some eight years, [the Commission] had conducted far-flung
investigations into every phase of legal discrimination and issued a
series of reports with specific recommendations for both
congressional and executive action to remedy the infringements of
equal rights so carefully documented by the staff's findings. In very
considerable part as a result of these findings and
recommendations, Congress passed the Civil Rights Acts of 1960
and 1964, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, while the Executive
Branch initiated a broad program to eliminate discrimination in
governmental agencies and Federally controlled programs of aid
and assistance to the states."
A statement made in 1963 by a one-time staff director of the
Commission made a similar point about the Commission's
effectiveness despite its lack of enforcement authority:
Though the Commission is a fact-finding agency alone and has no
powers of enforcement, it will, I believe, be seen by history as a
major and dynamic force for the realization of civil rights in
America. It has done things that no group or other agency could
do. It established national goals, conceived legislation, criticized
inaction, uncovered and exposed denials of equality in many fields
and places, prodded the Congress, nagged the Executive, and aided
the Courts. Above all, it has lacerated, sensitized, and perhaps
even recreated the national conscience.
72
69. FOSTER RHEA DULLES, THE CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION: 1957-1965 at 2-3
(1968).
70. Id. at 11-12 (citing H.R. 291, 85th Cong. (1957)). It may be noteworthy that
proposals for a Civil Rights Commission had circulated for years without success.
Congress created the Commission only after President Eisenhower included the proposal
in his 1956 State of the Union message. Id. at 11.
71. Id. at 257.
72. Id. at 258 (quoting speech of Berl Berhard).
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The recent history of the Civil Rights Commission reveals
significant fighting between liberals and conservatives and between
Republicans and Democrats. Civil rights issues have always been
controversial, but more recent disputes centered on partisan issues,
personalities, and appointments. That was not always true.73
Controversy over the Commission increased with actions taken and
appointments made by President Ronald Reagan in the early 1980s,
and continued during the Clinton and Bush Administrations.74 The
more recent record of the Commission is not the part of its history
that should be considered as a model for a privacy agency. The
recent controversies may be a partial reflection of the changed views
on civil rights and on the role of the Commission after decades of
activity and evolution.
The Civil Rights Commission shows that a government agency
can serve a useful purpose in highly visible and contentious public
policy disputes without having either regulatory or enforcement
authority. If a privacy board could accomplish some of what the Civil
Rights Commission did during in its early years, the contribution
would be important. No existing American institution plays the role
of fact finder, investigator, policy resource, and opinion leader for
privacy.
IV. Features of a Privacy Agency
The draft legislation identifies five mandatory functions for the
Privacy Protection Board, along with a larger set of permissive
activities. Most mandatory functions involve the preparation of
Privacy Act of 197471 guidelines and other materials for use by
agencies and the public. The Board would also be required to make
legislative recommendations for revising the Privacy Act. These
activities would result in valuable and needed materials. The Privacy
Act itself is woefully out of date, and no existing institution in
73. See Editorial, Sins of the Commission, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 2002, at A24,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A55482-2002Febl0.html:
It wasn't always this way-and needn't be so now. When the commission was
established during the Eisenhower administration, it used its investigative powers
to shed light on systemic civil rights problems, and it spoke with great moral
authority. That authority began breaking down during the 1970s, and the decline
hastened during the Reagan administration, which sought to turn the
commission's ideological direction around and make it a voice for conservative
policies. The result was a pitched ideological battle.
Id.
74. See, e.g., Darryl Fears, A Deepening Divide on U.S. Civil Rights Panel; Controversy
Over Appointment Highlights Historical Disagreements Over Commission's Role, WASH.
POST, Dec. 18, 2001, at A3.
75. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000).
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government or outside of government has the interest to undertake
the difficult task of modernizing what is now an ancient privacy law.76
All mandatory activities would be useful, but none justifies a
permanent privacy agency.
A. Functions: The Importance of Fair Information Practices
The most important mission for a Privacy Protection Board
would be to promote the adoption and implementation of Fair
Information Practices ("FIPs") in the United States. The reference to
FIPs is not casual. FIPs are the most widely recognized international
principles in information privacy. FIPs are especially significant
because they form the basis of most privacy laws around the world."
Even most U.S. privacy laws reflect FIPs to some extent, although
rarely with any overt awareness on the part of Congress. The
international policy convergence around FIPs has remained
substantially consistent for more than two decades.
Professor Colin Bennett, author of a study of international data
protection policies, described the scope of the international policy
consensus:
Many participants in, and observers of, the data protection
movement have remarked on the similar content of the laws passed
from country to country.... These impressions rest mainly on the
detection of a common set of principles for the treatment of
personal data. Names range from "principles for privacy
safeguards" to "principles for handling personal information" to
the "principles of fair information practice" to "data protection
principles" to the most commonly used "fair information
principles." I will show that, while the nomenclature and
codification may vary from country to country, the substance and
purpose of these principles are basically the same."
FIPs are an American invention. They were a major
contribution of the 1973 HEW Advisory Committee.79 According to
76. See Robert Gellman, Anyone Out There Up to Fixing the Privacy Act?, GOV'T
COMPUTER NEWS, Aug. 9, 1999, at 22 (suggesting that the Computer Science and
Telecommunications Board at the National Research Council be given an assignment to
propose revisions to the Act).
77. BENNETT, supra note 3, at 6. See also Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, A Review of
the Fair Information Principles: The Foundation of Privacy Public Policy, at
http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/fairinfo.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2003).
78. BENNETT, supra note 3, at 95-96.
79. HEW Report, supra note 38, at 41. The Committee's original formulation of the
Code was:
Safeguards for personal privacy based on our concept of mutuality in record
keeping would require adherence by record-keeping organizations to certain
fundamental principles of fair information practice.
There must be no personal-data record-keeping systems whose very existence
is secret;
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Committee Chairman Willis Ware, the name "Code of Fair
Information Practices" was inspired by the "Code of Fair Labor
Practices." '
Privacy scholar David Flaherty wrote that the FIPs Code "greatly
influenced the Privacy Act and subsequent data protection legislation
in other countries."8  European privacy laws starting in the early
1970s used the FIPs concepts included in the U.S. Privacy Act of
1974.2
As privacy laws spread throughout Europe, international
institutions showed interest, beginning with work initiated by the
Council of Europe in 1973. Ultimately, the Council adopted the
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to
Automatic Processing of Personal Data in 1980.3 The Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") issued its
own privacy guidelines around the same time.' Both documents
There must be a way for an individual to find out what information about him
is in a record and how it is used;
There must be a way for an individual to prevent information about him
obtained for one purpose from being used or made available for other purposes
without his consent;
There must be a way for an individual to correct or amend a record of
identifiable information about him; [and]
Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating records of
identifiable personal data must assure the reliability of the data for their intended
use and must take reasonable precautions to prevent misuse of the data.
Id. at 41.
80. Willis Ware, An Account of the HEW Advisory Committee (RAND Document P-
7846, 1993).
81. FLAHERTY, supra note 4, at 306. Colin Bennett called the Committee's report
"surprisingly coherent and influential." BENNETT, supra note 3, at 70.
82. See FLAHERTY, supra note 4, at 21, 107.
83. Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing
of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981, 20 I.L.M. 317 (entered into force Oct. 1, 1985), available at
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/treaties/html/108.htm.
84. Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev., Council Recommendation Concerning
Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data,
Oct. 1, 1980, 20 I.L.M. 422, available at http://www.oecd.org/EN/document/0,,EN-
document-43-1-no-24-10255-43,00.html.
The OECD Guidelines include these Fair Information Practices:
Collection Limitation Principle: There should be limits to the collection of
personal data and any such data should be obtained by lawful and fair means
and, where appropriate, with the knowledge or consent of the data subject.
Data Quality Principle: Personal data should be relevant to the purposes for
which they are to be used, and, to the extent necessary for those purposes, should
be accurate, complete and kept up-to-date.
Purpose Specification Principle: The purposes for which personal data are
collected should be specified not later than at the time of data collection and the
subsequent use limited to the fulfillment of those purposes or such others as are
relied upon FIPs as the central organizing principles. These two
documents spurred greater international recognition of FIPs as core
privacy policies during the 1980s. 5 The international organizations
expanded upon and revised the original statement of FIPs from the
HEW Advisory Committee seven years earlier.
An academic study 6 by Professor Colin Bennett of the
development of privacy policy suggested five major reasons for the
international convergence around FIPs. The first reason is the spread
of computer technology. Privacy was a concern before the computer,
but the data protection movement did not take hold before computer
use became widespread. Second, countries study the experiences of
others and emulate the solutions found elsewhere. Third, an
international policy community with shared interests and some
domestic influence spread common ideas and responses. Fourth,
privacy work undertaken by international organizations pressured
other governments to conform to international policies. Finally,
actions taken by one country can prompt other countries to adopt a
conforming policy.
The OECD statement of FIPs was embraced by the United
States, a member of the OECD. During the Reagan Administration,
not incompatible with those purposes and as are specified on each occasion of
change of purpose.
Use Limitation Principle: Personal data should not be disclosed, made available
or otherwise used for purposes other than those specified in accordance with ...
[the Purpose Specification Principle] except: (a) with the consent of the data
subject; or (b) by the authority of law.
Security Safeguards Principle: Personal data should be protected by reasonable
security safeguards against such risks as loss or unauthorized access, destruction,
use, modification or disclosure of data.
Openness Principle: There should be a general policy of openness about
developments, practices and policies with respect to personal data. Means
should be readily available of establishing the existence and nature of personal
data, and the main purposes of their use, as well as the identity and usual
residence of the data controller.
Individual Participation Principle: An individual should have the right: (a) to
obtain from a data controller, or otherwise, confirmation of whether or not the
data controller has data relating to him; (b) to have communicated to him, data
relating to him (i) within a reasonable time; (ii) at a charge, if any, that is not
excessive; (iii) in a reasonable manner; and (iv) in a form that is readily
intelligible to him; (c) to be given reasons if a request made under sub-
paragraphs (a) and (b) is denied, and to be able to challenge such denial; and (d)
to challenge data relating to him and, if the challenge is successful to have the
data erased, rectified, completed or amended.
Accountability Principle: A data controller should be accountable for complying
with measures which give effect to the principles stated above.
Id. at 424-25.
85. See BENNETr, supra note 3, at 130-40.
86. Id. at ch. 4.
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the National Telecommunications and Information Administration
("NTIA") at the Department of Commerce actively supported the
OECD Guidelines and urged corporations to comply voluntarily with
them.8 ' NTIA's support was part of an effort to show a serious
commitment to privacy through voluntary action rather than
legislationi8 More than 180 major U.S. multinational companies and
trade associations endorsed the guidelines. NTIA dropped its interest
in the Guidelines by 1983. The sincerity of the NTIA effort has been
questioned, and the effect of the endorsements was unclear at the
time.89 The corporate endorsements have long since been forgotten.
Regardless, the early expression of support for the OECD
Guidelines by the federal government and by private industry shows
that the Guidelines were not inconsistent with American values at the
time of their issuance. Nor are the Guidelines irrelevant in the
Internet era. At a 1998 meeting of OECD Ministers, the United
States joined with others to reaffirm the objectives of the Guidelines
for the collection and handling of personal data in any medium,
including global networks.' However, some critics believe that the
OECD Guidelines are out of date or in need of some revision.9
In the United States, restatements of FIPs without all
internationally recognized elements are found more frequently. The
87. See Report on OECD Guidelines Program: Hearings Before A Subcomm. of the
Comm. on Gov't Operations, 97th Cong., reprinted in INT'L TELECOM. & INFO. POL'Y 27-
58 (1981) (memorandum from Bernard J. Wunder, Jr., Assistant Sec'y for Commerce &
Info., Dep't of Commerce).
88. See WILLIAM J. ANDERSON, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRIVACY POLICY
ACTIVITIES OF THE NAT'L TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFO. ADMIN., 4 (GGD-84-93,
1984).
89. See Privacy Regulatory Proposals, supra note 12, at 227-33.
90. OECD Ministerial Conference, Conference Conchsions (1998),
www.anu.edu.au/mail-archives/link/link981010208.html.
91. See, e.g., Roger Clarke, Beyond the OECD Guidelines: Privacy Protection for the
21st Century (2000), http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/PP21C.html (last
visited Feb. 26, 2003). In 1999, Mr. Justice Michael Kirby of the High Court of
Australia-the former chair of the OECD Committee that developed the 1980 Privacy
Guidelines-suggested that some updating of the Guidelines might be needed in light of
advances in technology. See his remarks at the International Conference on Privacy and
Personal Data Protection (1999), http://www.pco.org.hk/english/infocentre/
conference.html. Kirby concluded, however, that the OECD "framework of privacy
principles.., has been extraordinarily successful and remarkably enduring." Id. See also
Ann Cavoukian, A Report to the 22nd International Conference of Data Protection
Commissioners: Should the OECD Guidelines Apply to Personal Data Online? (2000),
http://www.ipc.on.ca/scripts/index-.asp?action=31&p ID=11425&NID=1&PTID=98&U
_ID=0 (last visited Feb. 26, 2003).
92. Restatements in other countries are also found. It is much more likely, however,
that other countries will adopt a policy close to the OECD principles. In Canada, for
example, the Canadian Standards Association ("CSA") developed a privacy code as a
National Standard of Canada in 1996. MODEL CODE FOR THE PROTECTION OF
use of FIPs as a label for privacy policies is slowly increasing in the
United States, and this suggests that international standards are
seeping into American consciousness. However, American versions
of FIPs are often significantly bowdlerized, with modifications or
omissions to provisions that the business community views as
inconvenient.
An example of an abbreviated version of FIPs comes from the
Federal Trade Commission.93 In 2000, the Commission recommended
that consumer-oriented commercial web sites that collect personal
identifying information from or about consumers online should be
required to comply with "the four widely-accepted fair information
practices." The FTC's version of FIPs includes notice, choice, access
and correction, and security. The choice principle is not a core
element of traditional FIPs. Choice means that consumers would
have to be offered some ability to say how their personal data may be
used for secondary purposes, a significantly weaker provision.
The FTC statement of FIPs does not address the collection
limitation or data quality principle. The accountability principle is not
mentioned, but it is part of the FTC's proposal by implication since
the Commission would enforce the legislation, and that enforcement
would provide accountability. The other missing principle is that of
purpose specification. The Commission's choice principle appears to
be a partial substitute. What is absent is any requirement that a
record keeper specify the purposes for data collection, and that
subsequent use or disclosure be limited to those purposes and other
closely related purposes.
Interestingly, the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act," a
1998 law that the FTC enforces, addresses all traditional elements of
PERSONAL INFORMATION CAN/CSA Q830-96 (Can. Standards Ass'n), available at
http://www.qmi.com/registration/privacy/default.asp?load=content&anguage=Engiish.
The starting point for the CSA effort was the OECD Privacy Guidelines. In 2000, Canada
then enacted a private sector privacy law that directly incorporated the CSA Model Code
into law. Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, R.S.C., ch. 5
(2000) (Can.), available at http://www.privcom.gc.ca/legislation/02_06-01-e.asp. The
Canadian law was found by the European Commission to meet EU standards for data
protection laws. Commission Regulation 2002/2 of 20 December 2001 on the Adequate
Protection of Personal Data Provided by the Canadian Personal Information Protection
and Electronic Documents Act, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/en/dat/2002/l_002/1_00220020104en00130016.pdf. The acceptance of the Canadian law
by the EU shows how different formulations of FIPs can still meet international standards.
For some history and background on the CSA Privacy Standard and Canadian legislation,
see generally STEPHANIE PERRIN ET AL., THE PERSONAL INFORMATION PROTECTION
AND ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS ACT: AN ANNOTATED GUIDE (2001).
93. FED. TRADE COMM'N, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN
THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE, (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/
privacy2000/privacy2000.pdf.
94. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-06 (2000).
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FIPs in some manner. However, the Commission did not recommend
that all FIPs elements be included in proposed legislation applying to
a broader set of web site operators and data subjects. Nor did the
Commission explain why it did not support enactment for all Internet
users of the FIPs applicable to children. The Commission's
formulation of FIPs was similar to versions from parts of the
American business community.9
The FTC's endorsement of a diluted version of FIPs is one
reason that the Commission is not a good candidate to serve a larger
role in privacy policy. The Commission's privacy vision is too limited.
In addition, the Commission does not have jurisdiction over many
private sector, non-profit, and governmental record keepers.
The purpose of this discussion of FIPs is to show that a
congressional statement about the value of FIPs in establishing
privacy rules would be valuable and essential. The Privacy Protection
Board needs to have some legislative policy direction to guide its
work. The draft bill deliberately lists only the titles of the OECD
FIPs principles and does not reproduce the content. One reason for
the limited reference is political. The full OECD statement of FIPs
would be too much of a lightning rod in the current environment to
expect that it could survive the congressional process. Failure to
recognize all elements of FIPs might, however, lead privacy advocates
and other national privacy agencies to view the Privacy Protection
Board as too crippled to be useful.
Another reason has to do with the nature of FIPs. Translating
FIPs into privacy laws or policies is complex and judgmental because
the FIPs principles are not self-implementing. For any type of
records or record keeper, application of FIPs depends on many
factors, including the type of data involved, the type of the record
keeper, the purpose of processing, the way in which the data will be
used and disclosed, the technology employed, costs, and the traditions
of the jurisdiction, industry, or record keeper. A common reliance on
FIPs does not avoid all problems or conflicts and does not answer all
privacy policy questions. What FIPs provide is a common menu of
information privacy issues for consideration by policy makers. FIPs
do not guarantee complete compatibility or commonality of response.
Protecting privacy nearly always requires a balance. In the
words of one data protection scholar, "[p]rivacy protection in law and
practice involves a balance between competing values in order to
achieve a result that safeguards individual privacy while also
95. Some in the business community would find even the FTC's limited version of
FIPs to be too strong. See, e.g., the privacy protection practices of The Direct Marketing
Association, http://www.the-dma.org/privacy.shtml (last visited Feb. 26, 2003). The
DMA's privacy policy is basically notice and opt-out. Id. Most FIPs elements are missing.
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accommodating other important social, political, or economic ends." 96
These other goals include national security, law enforcement,
economy and efficiency, and public health. FIPs provide a framework
for making sure that the balancing includes essential elements of
privacy. The application of the same principles will not always result
in the same outcome. The tradeoffs between privacy and other values
depend greatly on the context.
This diversity is needed in setting a broad policy direction for a
privacy agency. Congress is not likely to agree on many details
because there is no consensus in the United States on those details.
However, Congress could well agree on broadly stated general
principles, with the express understanding that those principles can be
applied in different ways. Consensus is possible, but only at higher
levels of generality. Part of the work of the Privacy Protection Board
would be translating FIPs into practice and helping record keepers
and record subjects address the implementation specifics.
Another reason for starting from international principles is to
bring the United States more into conformity with the rest of the
world. Even if American acceptance of international principles is
only skin deep, it will help to lessen differences between the privacy
regimes in the United States and other countries. A formal legislative
recognition of FIPs will be a valuable step.
B. No Regulatory Authority
The Privacy Protection Board would have no regulatory powers.
There are several reasons for proposing a non-regulatory agency.
First, as the history of the Civil Rights Commission
demonstrates, it is possible for a non-regulatory agency to contribute
to a national response to a contentious policy issue. The answer to all
privacy problems is not necessarily additional regulation. At least
some of the laws and regulations adopted to date have not produced
results that make record keepers or record subjects happy.' Indeed,
96. Charles D. Raab, From Balancing to Steering: New Directions for Data Protection,
in VISIONS OF PRIVACY: POLICY CHOICES FOR THE DIGITAL AGE 68, 68 (Colin J.
Bennett & Rebecca Grant eds., 1999) (footnote omitted).
97. Perhaps the best example is the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 6801
(2000). Janger & Schwartz say that GLB "has managed to disappoint both industry
leaders and privacy advocates alike." Edward J. Janger & Paul M. Schwartz, The Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act, Information Privacy, and the Limits of Default Rules, 86 MINN. L. REV.
1219, 1230 (2002). For complaints from organizations representing consumers, see, e.g.,
An Examination of Existing Federal Statutes Addressing Information Privacy: Hearing
Before The House Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 107th Cong. (2001) (testimony of Ed
Mierzwinski, Consumer Program Director, U.S. Public Interest Research Group),
available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/lO7/hearings/0403200lHearingl54/
Mierzwinski242.htm; Mark Hochhauser, Ph.D., Lost in the Fine Print: Readability of
Financial Privacy Notices, at http://privacyrights.org/ar/GLB-Reading.htm (last visited
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it is hard to point to a fully successful privacy legislative or regulatory
initiative. The shortcomings of current regulatory efforts suggest a
reason to explore alternative approaches to addressing privacy issues.
Second, the task of regulating all activities in the United States
that affect privacy would be overwhelming. Every institution that
maintains personal data, including all government agencies, private
businesses and non-profit organizations, might be the target of
regulation. Even a mildly comprehensive attempt to regulate
personal data processing activities could take decades. The politics of
comprehensive privacy regulation would be impossible to manage,
and the administration of broad rules would require enormous
resources. Omnibus privacy legislation of the type found in Europe
and elsewhere around the world is not likely to succeed in America,
in part because of American demands for detailed regulatory
instruments.
Third, some existing agencies already conduct limited regulation
of activities affecting privacy. The Federal Trade Commission
oversees the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 8 the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act,"9 and the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act. 'a The
Federal Communications Commission has responsibilities under the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act.0' The Department of
Education enforces the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act.0 2
Whether any of these agencies is doing a good job is an open
question. All have many other responsibilities, and their interest in
privacy enforcement has waxed and waned over the years. However,
trying to transfer all of these enforcement and oversight functions to a
new agency would be a political impossibility.
Fourth, a Privacy Protection Board would be more effective
supplementing rather than replacing existing regulators. The Board's
permissive functions would include receiving complaints,
participating in agency proceedings, and petitioning agencies to take
action on matters affecting privacy rights and interests. The Board
could use its limited resources to encourage other agencies to do a
Feb. 26, 2003). While consumer groups find GLB too weak, financial institutions tend to
think that the law strikes the right balance. However, the lack of federal preemption of
state laws in GLB draws objections. See, e.g., Financial Privacy and Consumer Protection:
Hearing Before The Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 107th Cong.
(2002) (testimony of John Dugan, Financial Services Coordinating Council), available at
http://banking.senate.gov/02-09hrg/091902/dugan.htm.
98. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s (2000).
99. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6804-05 (2000). Numerous other federal agencies share in regulatory
and enforcement activities under the law. Id.
100. 15 U.S.C. § 6505 (2000).
101. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2000).
102. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2000).
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better job with their ongoing responsibilities, particularly their
enforcement responsibilities.
C. Independence
The most important feature of the proposed Privacy Protection
Board is independence. The Board would be an independent agency
in the executive branch, with its members appointed by the President,
and confirmed by the Senate. The President would designate the
Chairman. Members would serve fixed term appointments, with the
possibility of reappointment to a single additional term. The Board
would be an independent agency just like the Federal Trade
Commission, Federal Communications Commission, and Securities
and Exchange Commission. Members of the Privacy Protection
Board would have the ability, by virtue of fixed term appointments,
to speak their minds on matters relating to privacy. Like members of
other comparable independent agencies, they would not be subject to
removal from office for disagreeing with the President.
The principal reason for independence is simple. Only an
independent agency can criticize the policies and practices of the
executive branch. Whether the government or the private sector
presents the greatest threat to privacy is an interesting subject for
debate. However, it is undisputed that many routine government
functions can have drastic effects on the privacy rights and interests of
individuals. The federal government maintains enormous volumes of
personal information for its own operations. The federal government
would be a major subject of inquiry for a privacy agency, along with
the private sector.
Any privacy policy or oversight function assigned to an agency
within the executive branch and subject to the direct control of the
President cannot be independent. For example, the Privacy
Counselor who served at the Office of Management and Budget from
1999-2001 appeared to make a significant contribution to the setting
of policy in the Clinton Administration. 3 Despite the limited
resources available to the Privacy Counselor (there were only two
other staff positions in his immediate office), the Counselor played an
important role on privacy issues related to health, financial, and
Internet privacy policy and legislation. In addition, the Counselor
103. In an unpublished paper, the Clinton Administration's privacy counselor argues
with some persuasion that a privacy official located at OMB is valuably involved in
coordinating privacy policy across multiple issues and multiple agencies. See Peter P.
Swire, The Administration Response to the Challenges of Protecting Privacy (Jan. 8, 2000)
(unpublished draft), http://www.peterswire.net/STANF7.doc. Swire also argues that a
political appointee, rather than a civil servant, can be more effective. Id. at 35.
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worked on international privacy efforts as well as a variety of other
legislative, regulatory, and administrative matters.
However, the Privacy Counselor was not an independent voice.
The Privacy Counselor was located in the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs"'° at OMB under the supervision of several levels
of OMB management. He had no ability to publicly question,
criticize, or object to decisions announced by the administration.
Once the Clinton Administration established policy, the Privacy
Counselor was obliged to publicly support that policy. No matter
how effective an internal voice may be, it is not the equivalent of an
independent, external one.
A privacy office located in another agency would be subject to
the same limitations. Consider how a privacy office established in the
Department of Commerce might function." Disputes between the
privacy office and the Bureau of the Census (another component of
the Commerce Department) would almost certainly be resolved by
the Secretary of Commerce. A privacy officer within a department
would not have the ability to appeal beyond the Secretary. Disputes
between a privacy policy office at the Commerce Department and
government offices in other departments would be more likely to be
resolved outside the Department, probably by OMB. In either case, a
privacy office might not be able to raise questions publicly, hold
hearings, solicit comments, or conduct investigations, and the office
would certainly not be able to speak publicly without the approval of
its political overseers at the Commerce Department.
A Privacy Protection Board would not be the exclusive privacy
office for the executive branch. A privacy policy function can, and
perhaps should, be included within any administration. Many
government activities affect privacy, and an administration is obliged
to take positions on privacy legislation proposed by Congress and on
international privacy matters. The coordination of privacy policy
within the executive branch is just as important as the coordination of
policies on communications, securities regulation, trade regulation,
and other issue areas assigned to independent regulatory agencies.
The importance of independence in data protection agencies is
well-established in the EU and elsewhere around the world. A
prefatory recital to the EU Data Protection Directive states expressly
that "complete independence" is an "essential component" of the
104. Id. at 20.
105. See PETER P. SWIRE & ROBERT E. LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS: WORLD
DATA FLOWS, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, AND THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY DIRECTIVE
(1998). The authors recommended that a privacy office be established in the Department
of Commerce, rejecting OMB or other parts of the Executive Office of the President as a
home. Id. at 185-86. Swire later became the privacy counselor at OMB. Swire, supra
note 103, at 1.
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protection of individual privacy."6 The substantive provisions of the
Directive require each Member State to have an independent
supervisory authority that must be consulted when administrative
activities will affect the processing of personal data."7 The authority
must have power to investigate, to intervene, and to engage in legal
proceedings. The EU standards for supervisory authorities have
influenced the establishment of most privacy agencies in other
countries.
Professor Flaherty's review of international privacy activities also
emphasized the importance of independence in the operations of data
protection offices:
[D]ata protection agencies exercise a degree of independence in the
performance of their tasks that is relatively unusual among
governmental institutions. Observers and practitioners agree that
data protection agencies require as much independence as is
constitutionally possible, subject to the most appropriate type of
governmental, legislative, administrative, or judicial review, since
independence must be balanced with some form of accountability.' 8
Independence is vital for a privacy agency's governmental
oversight activities. However, that does not mean that the agency
should only have governmental responsibilities. Independence may
not be as crucial for an agency's review of private sector privacy
activities, but the agency can and should play a role with respect to
the private sector. No existing agency has a broad mandate to
oversee private sector self-regulatory privacy activities.
D. Private Sector Responsibilities
Even though the proposed privacy agency would not have any
regulatory authority over the private sector, it could and should have
the ability to support and encourage the adoption and
implementation of FIPs by private sector organizations, including
both for profit and non-profit institutions. The draft proposal allows
the Privacy Protection Board to "comment on or assist in the
development or implementation of policies designed to provide for
the protection of personal information maintained by private sector
record keepers." Under this authority, the Board could informally
approve a self-regulatory privacy code at the request of the
proponent. The Board could also comment upon codes adopted
without its approval.
In Europe, where legislation establishes mandatory privacy
standards, codes of conduct "contribute to the proper
106. Council Directive 95/46, recital 62, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, available at
http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/dp/material/directiv.htm.
107. Id. at art. 28.
108. FLAHERTY, supra note 4, at 391 (footnote omitted).
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implementation""'9 of national laws. The Netherlands offers a partial
model. The Netherlands data protection law gives the data
protection authority a formal role in approving private sector codes of
conduct. Under the Dutch law, an organization applies to the College
Bescherming Persoonsgegevens (Dutch Data Protection Authority)
seeking a declaration that a sectoral code of conduct properly reflects
the legal requirements for the processing of personal data. The law
requires that requests for approval must come from a representative
organization, that the sector be precisely defined, and that any
dispute procedures be independent.
Despite the lack of privacy legislation covering most personal
data processing activities in the United States, industry or company
codes are increasingly common. However, the quality of those codes
is highly variable. One reason is that codes are typically drafted by
the industry without any outside participation or comment. No
existing institution serves as a proxy for data subjects. Occasionally, a
privacy advocacy group will comment, positively or negatively, on a
private sector policy. The Federal Trade Commission has also
commented from time to time on industry codes."' State attorneys
general also provide some review of industry privacy activities, and
the states have regularly been more effective in producing meaningful
change than the FTC." However, systematic review of most private
sector privacy policies is rare.
Several organizations have been established to give seals of
approval to corporate privacy policies for web sites. TRUSTe 3 and
109. Council Directive 95/46, supra note 106, at art. 27(1).
110. Personal Data Protection Act, No. 92 at art. 25 (1999) (Neth.) (Session 1999-2000
Nr. 92), available at http://www.cbpweb.nl/english/en-pdpa.htm. The EU Data Protection
Directive encourages the use of industry codes of conduct. See Council Directive 95/46 at
art. 27.
111. The Children's Online Privacy Protection Act encourages a safe harbor procedure
as an incentive for self-regulation, and the FTC must approve requests for safe harbor
treatment. 15 U.S.C. § 6503 (2000).
112. An interesting comparison of the effectiveness of the review of private sector
privacy policies can be taken from recent events involving Amazon.com. In 2000, Amazon
announced a change in its privacy policy. Two organizations asked the FTC to investigate
the changes, alleging that Amazon deceived consumers in representations about its
privacy policy. The FTC reviewed the matter and did not act. Two years later, several
state attorneys general pressured Amazon.com to revise the same privacy policy. See Troy
Wolverton, Amazon to Revamp Privacy Policy, CNET NEWS.COM (Sept. 25, 2002), at
http://news.com.com/2100-1017-959571.html. State attorneys general have often produced
better results for consumers on privacy matters than the FTC. See, e.g., Professor Joel
Reidenberg, The Toysmart Bankruptcy, Paper Presented at the 23rd International
Conference of Data Protection Commissioners (Sept. 24, 2001),
http://reidenberg.home.sprynet.com/Toysmart.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2003). See also
Robert Gellman, States Are Trumping FTC on Privacy, DM NEWS, Oct. 7, 2002, at 12.
113. See http://truste.org (last visited Feb. 26, 2003).
BBBOnline"4 are two examples. These seal programs rely mostly on
disclosure of privacy policies and a procedure for resolution of
complaints. Substantive standards are weak. The credibility of the
programs has suffered because financial support for the privacy seal
organization comes from the corporate seal holders. TRUSTe in
particular has been the subject of a constant series of attacks for not
acting against companies believed to have violated TRUSTe's rules."'
The seal programs do not have sufficient independence to be able to
serve a broader role. The programs also have had limited success in
attracting participants.
A federal Privacy Protection Board would offer record keepers
adopting privacy policies both a source of expertise and independent
approval. By operating under a statutory mandate to encourage the
adoption and implementation of FIPs, the Board could measure
privacy codes against general standards. Approval of a privacy policy
or self-regulatory code by the Privacy Protection Board would offer a
significant degree of assurance that the policy or code should be
accepted by data subjects as providing an adequate degree of privacy
protection.
Imagine that a trade association decides to develop a self-
regulatory code for privacy. Under today's pattern, the association
develops the code through closed industry deliberations and
announces its adoption with a glowing press statement about the
great privacy advances it has voluntarily adopted. The lack of tension
undercuts the credibility of self-regulation. This pattern has produced
a series of industry self-regulatory actions ranging from indifferent to
worthless.
However, consider the same scenario with a privacy agency
willing and able to measure the self-regulatory code against a fair
information practice yardstick. No industry is likely to take the
chance that its self-regulatory code will be undercut by criticism from
a privacy agency. To forestall criticism, the industry would likely ask
the privacy agency for a blessing. The resulting discussion and
negotiations will lead to a stronger and more complete set of privacy
rules. Much can be accomplished without the need for legislation or
regulation.
A privacy agency would benefit both consumers and industry.
The advantage for consumers is more honest and balanced self-
regulatory codes of practice. The advantage for business is the ability
114. See http://bbbonline.org (last visited Feb. 26, 2003).
115. See, e.g., Paul Boutin, Just How Trusty Is Truste?, WIRED NEWS, Apr. 9, 2002, at
http://www.wired.com/news/exec/0,1370,51624,00.html; Alex Lash, No More Hand-
Holding, THE INDUSTRY STANDARD, Nov. 12, 1999, available at
http://www.thestandard.com/article/display/0,1902,7648,00.html.
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to adopt privacy rules with the support and assistance of an institution
charged with protecting privacy. Today, businesses face criticism
over privacy actions no matter what they do. No existing consumer
or privacy institution has the standing or resources to negotiate over
privacy on behalf of the public. A privacy agency can perform that
function with credibility, and it can defend the results of the process.
The result would be enhanced self-regulation with greater credibility.
No institution would be obliged to bring its pivacy rules to the Board
for approval. However, the credibility of an unapproved code would
be diminished, and the risk of negative comments from the Board
would discourage the adoption of weak privacy codes. An agency can
also seek to make sure that a code is working as promised, and this
would contribute to the maintenance of a level playing field among
competing companies.
E. International Activities
The proposed legislation would give the Privacy Protection
Board the ability to play a role in international privacy matters. The
Board could assist in coordination of U.S. privacy laws, policies, and
practices with laws, policies, and practices of foreign governments. It
could also accept inquiries and complaints from foreign governments.
The Board would not be empowered to represent the United
States formally on international privacy matters. Official
representation would continue to belong to the President and to
agencies that the President controls directly. The Board could
participate in lower level international cooperative efforts, and the
Board could provide continuity in international relations that has
been missing to date. A stable U.S. presence at international privacy
conferences and discussions would be welcomed, and it is likely that
differences between the United States and other nations over privacy
could be more easily resolved as a result.
In addition, the Board could solve a potential problem with the
Safe Harbor Agreement between the Department of Commerce and
the European Commission. The Agreement was finalized in 2000 to
address data protection barriers to the transfer of personal data from
EU Member States to the United States. The EU Data Protection
Directive prohibits the transfer of personal data to non-EU nations
that do not meet the European "adequacy" standard for privacy
protection."6 The Safe Harbor Agreement allows a U.S. company to
certify to compliance with the Agreement's standards. The EU
accepts the certification and allows personal data to be sent to that
116. Council Directive 95/46, supra note 106, at art. 25(1).
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company in the United States despite the absence of adequate privacy
laws.117
An essential element of the Safe Harbor Agreement is
enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission against Safe Harbor
companies that do not comply with their promise to comply with the
standards in the Agreement. The FTC claims jurisdiction under
section 5 of the FTC Act prohibiting unfair or deceptive acts or
practices. Under the FTC's view of its law, a company's failure to
comply with a promise to meet Safe Harbor standards would be
actionable as an unfair or deceptive practice. "8 The FTC promised to
give priority to complaints regarding privacy violations by Safe
Harbor companies. " 9
However, it is not entirely clear that the FTC's jurisdiction
extends to protecting foreign consumers. Professor Joel Reidenberg
reviewed the legislative and judicial history of section 5 of the FTC
Act and concluded that the FTC's assertion of jurisdiction over the
Safe Harbor process "is a radical departure from the stated legislative
purposes of the statute and in direct opposition to the Supreme
Court's restrictive interpretation of section 5 authority."'20 Without
the possibility of FTC enforcement, the entire Safe Harbor process
would be in danger of collapse.
The Privacy Protection Board could take over some of the
enforcement role in international privacy arrangements under the
provision allowing it to accept and investigate inquiries and
complaints from foreign governments with respect to privacy rights
and interests. The Board would not need the full range of
enforcement powers that the FTC exercises. It would only need to
find facts. Once the Board determined that a Safe Harbor company
violated its agreement to comply with the Safe Harbor principles,
enforcement would come from the EU by cutting off the flow of
personal data to the offending company. The Board would not have
to enforce its findings. The FTC could still play a role when
appropriate by pursuing other remedies if needed.
117. The Department of Commerce's Safe Harbor web site can be found at
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor. As of the beginning of February 2003, fewer than 300
companies have agreed to enter the Safe Harbor. See http://web.ita.doc.gov/
safeharbor, hlist.nsf/webPages/safe+harbor+list (last visited Feb. 26, 2003).
118. Letter from Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, to John
Mogg, Director, DG XV, European Commission, T 3 (July 14, 2000), available at
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/FTCLETrERFINAL.htm.
119. Id. at 6.
120. Implications for the U.S. Privacy Debate: Hearing on the EU Data Protection
Initiative Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade & Consumer Prot. of the House
Comm.on Energy & Commerce, 107th Cong. (2001) (testimony of Joel R. Reidenberg,
Professor of Law, Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law), available at
http://reidenberg.home.sprynet.com/ReidenbergTestimony_03-08-01.htm.
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F. Federal Government Privacy Management and Oversight
The proposed legislation assigns the Privacy Protection Board
responsibilities regarding federal agency activities under the Privacy
Act of 1974. These include developing privacy guidelines for federal
agencies; issuing advisory opinions regarding the Act; investigating
compliance with the Act; filing comments on proposals to create or
amend Privacy Act systems of records or rules; and commenting on
actions of federal agencies that affect privacy. The Board would be
required to develop several different types of guides and guidelines.
The authority to advise, investigate, and comment would be
permissive. No agency would be required to comply with the advice
or recommendations of the Board.
No existing federal agency has the authority and interest to
oversee Privacy Act operations. The Privacy Act of 1974 assigned the
Office of Management and Budget responsibility for developing
guidelines and regulations and for providing continuing assistance to
and oversight of agency implementation of the Act."' Except for the
brief period during the Clinton Administration when OMB had a
Privacy Counselor, OMB has paid little attention to its Privacy Act
responsibilities during the last twenty-five years.122 Even during the
Privacy Counselor's tenure, the Privacy Act was a relatively minor
focus of attention. While OMB has the power to direct other
agencies to do a better job of Privacy Act compliance, OMB does not
have the interest to engage in meaningful oversight.
The proposed Privacy Protection Board would be able to carry
out the responsibilities that OMB has ignored in the past. The Board
would not have direct authority to order agencies to take actions
because of concern that an independent agency could not
constitutionally issue orders to an agency subject to direct
presidential control. The Board could review agency Privacy Act
activities and could work cooperatively with OMB to improve
government-wide compliance with the Act.
Conclusion
Professor Spiros Simitis, Germany's first data protection official
described the American approach to data protection as "an obviously
erratic regulation full of contradictions, characterized by a fortuitous
121. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(v) (2000).
122. H.R. REP. No. 98-455, at 34-35 (1983); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
PRIVACY ACT: FEDERAL AGENCIES' IMPLEMENTATION CAN BE IMPROVED (GGD-86-
107, 1986). See, e.g., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, 99TH CONG., FEDERAL GOV'T
INFO. TECH.: ELEC. RECORD SYS. AND INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY (1986); Privacy
Regulatory Proposals, supra note 12, at 221-26.
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and totally unbalanced choice of its subjects." '23 Simitis wrote those
words in 1992, but the situation has really not changed.
The American approach to privacy is, in many ways, a reflection
of the American approach to law and public policy when there is no
clear consensus about the right thing to do or how to do it. We lurch
back and forth between disjointed and inconsistent responses. We
apply last year's response to next year's technology, and we find that
the result does not work well. We do nothing when something is
needed, and when we do something, it often does not work. We pass
legislation to protect the privacy of one type of record while allowing
virtually identical records to remain unregulated. '24
We rarely confront privacy issues squarely or comprehensively.
We do little to educate the American public or corporate record
keepers about the real stakes in the privacy arena or about the
limitations of what can be achieved in the modern world. We obscure
questions about who bears the cost of protecting privacy. As a
result, expectations are often unrealistic, and solutions rarely match
the expectations or the political rhetoric.
Addressing privacy is especially hard because the borders of
privacy can be impossible to define with any precision. It is difficult
to cleanly distinguish between types of records. A health record in
one context becomes a financial or Internet record in another. For
example, when a co-payment of a health insurance claim is made by a
patient to a physician through an online transfer of funds, are the
resulting records subject to rules for health records, banking records,
insurance records, or Internet records? Similarly, it is difficult to
draw a clean line between sectors because traditional sectoral lines
blur, and the same personal data may be used for multiple purposes
by a company with numerous lines of unrelated business.
It is also difficult or impossible to identify real borders, whether
between states or nations.1 26 Internet transactions can take place with
123. Spiros Simitis, New Trends in National and International Data Protection Law, in
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN DATA PRIVACY LAW 22 (J. Dumortier ed., 1992).
124. For example, the Cable Communications Policy Act provides some privacy
protections for personal information collected by cable television operators, but others
who provide similar services through direct broadcast satellite or in other ways are not
subject to the same rules. 47 U.S.C. § 551 (2000). The Video Privacy Protection Act
protects privacy and First Amendment interests by limiting the use and disclosure of video
rental records. 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2000). No law protects similar interests in book or
magazine purchase records.
125. See Robert Gellman, Privacy, Consumers, and Costs: How The Lack of Privacy
Costs Consumers and Why Business Studies of Privacy Costs are Biased and Incomplete
(2002), at http://www.epic.org/reports/dmfprivacy.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2003).
126. See Robert M. Gellman, Can Privacy Be Regulated Effectively on a National
Level? Thoughts on the Possible Need for International Privacy Rules, 41 VILL. L. REV.
129 (1996).
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neither the merchant nor the customer knowing in which legal
jurisdiction the other resides. Merchants are often located in multiple
jurisdictions, and they may be unable to determine which privacy laws
apply to which transactions. Small differences in data processing
methodology can make a large difference to jurisdictional
determinations.'27 The confusion can be seen in U.S. privacy laws,
which sometimes share jurisdiction between state and federal
128governments, and which sometimes ignore international
implications."'
We cannot always clearly distinguish an online activity from an
offline activity. When an online order results in physical delivery of a
product, should the resulting records be subject to the rules for online
or offline records? It can even be difficult to distinguish clearly or
fairly between opt-in and opt-out regimes for regulating personal data
uses.13° The difficulty of making these distinctions will not disappear
soon. A permanent privacy agency with expertise will help.
However, an agency will not be a magic bullet that will make the
problems disappear immediately or permanently.
One of the major political shortcomings with a privacy agency-
and especially a non-regulatory agency-is that it offers a procedural
or institutional response to a substantive problem. It is hard to
explain why a small bureaucracy without any direct regulatory
authority will help a voter who has a credit record replete with errors;
a victim of identity theft; an individual who hates spam and
telemarketers; a person who doesn't want his personal data sold to
profilers by government; a Netizen who doesn't want her email read
by government agents without sufficient cause; or a pedestrian,
127. See, e.g., WORKING PARTY ON THE PROT. OF INDIVIDUALS WITH REGARD TO
THE PROCESSING OF PERSONAL DATA, WORKING DOCUMENT DETERMINING THE
INTERNATIONAL APPLICATION OF EU DATA PROTECTION LAW TO PERSONAL DATA
PROCESSING ON THE INTERNET BY NON-EU BASED WEB SITES (2002). The Working
Party is established by Article 29 of the EU Data Protection Directive. See
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/internal-market/en/dataprot/wpdocs/wp56-en.pdf (last
visited Feb. 26, 2003).
128. The health privacy rule promulgated under the authority of the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-22 (2002), allows state laws that are
more stringent than and not contrary to the federal rule to remain in effect. 45 C.F.R.
§ 160.203 (2002). See also the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. 15 U.S.C. § 6807 (2000).
129. The Children's Online Privacy Protection Act applies to web sites outside the
United States. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-06 (2000). The international application of this law was
somewhat surprising in light of U.S. objections to the international application of EU data
protection laws.
130. See, e.g., Ari Schwartz & Paula J. Bruening, Center for Democracy and
Technology, On Consent, Choice, and Check Boxes: Sorting Out the Opt-In v. Opt-Out
Debate (undated), at http://www.cdt.org/publications/optin-optout.shtml (last visited Feb.
26, 2003).
driver, or traveler who does not want to be subjected to surveillance
by cameras in the airport, on the highway, or in a store.
Others are unhappy with an agency because they are afraid that
it will not facilitate their favored response to privacy. Some object
because a privacy agency is not a law or regulation, and the creation
of an agency will offer those who oppose laws and regulations a new
reason for opposition. Others see a privacy agency as the camel's
nose under the tent, with the camel in this case being more legislation
and regulation. Some fear a privacy agency because it could make
the self-regulatory process more honest and rigorous, and companies
will be less able to adopt policies that have little or no substance.
Some disapprove because the agency offers no remedies to
individuals whose privacy has been violated. Others express concern
that an independent agency will not have enough influence to affect
federal government activities. Still others will oppose a privacy
agency unless it guarantees federal preemption of state laws, class
action lawsuits, a stronger role for consent in disclosures of health
information, an exemption for their activity, or some other specific
objective. Some will dissent because they do not want to perpetuate
privacy as a public policy concern, hoping that privacy will eventually
go away. Finally, some raise objections on grounds of cost, although
a small agency with a hundred employees would cost less than $15
million annually.
These objections miss the point. A privacy agency will not
guarantee any particular outcome. Everyone on all sides of the issue
will take an equal chance that his or her preferred response to privacy
will be encouraged by a Privacy Protection Board.
The most likely role for a privacy agency will be to serve as a
catalyst. A Privacy Protection Board will help to achieve the
responses to privacy that we are likely to achieve in its absence, but
the Board will do so more quickly, more efficiently, and more
consistently. If we choose legislation and regulation, the Privacy
Protection Board will make that solution work better. If we choose
self-regulation, the Board will make self-regulation work better.
Even if we do nothing, the Board will contribute by conducting
studies, doing oversight, encouraging more cooperation among all
relevant parties, and keeping governmental and private sector record
keepers honest. Under any scenario, the Board will contribute to a
better understanding of privacy, information and other technologies,
and public concerns.
Admittedly, there is a risk that a privacy agency may not achieve
these results. A Privacy Protection Board could be populated with
too many pro-privacy zealots or too many privacy detractors to
develop credibility. Members of the Board could be lazy, cynical, out
of touch, uncreative, indifferent, or undiplomatic. These are some
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characteristics of the American approach to privacy seen in the last
two decades. The greater risk is that we will continue stumbling
down the crooked path we are on, and that we will never find a
coherent way to make sense out of the conflicting demands for use
and for protection of personal data. We have little to lose by
proceeding with a privacy agency.
The failure of the United States to have a national privacy
agency is, perhaps, the single most important difference in approach
to data protection between the United States and most other
industrialized countries."' Professor David Flaherty was direct in
describing the effect of this difference. "The United States carries out
data protection differently than other countries, and on the whole
does it less well, because of the lack of an oversight agency.' ' 32
Since Flaherty wrote those words in 1989, the rest of the world
has moved toward the European Union's model of data protection.
More countries have data protection authorities that operate with a
significant degree of independence. Data protection agencies in other
countries have not become unreasonable or irresistible bureaucracies.
Most of these agencies make useful contributions to the difficult
privacy issues that every nation faces. An American Privacy
Protection Board will do the same.
The time has come to establish an American Privacy Protection
Board.
131. Paul Schwartz, Data Processing and Government Administration: The Failure of
the American Legal Response to the Computer, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1321, 1383 (1992) ("The
United States is almost alone among Western nations in its failure to create an institution
with [data protection] expertise.").
132. FLAHERTY, supra note 4, at 305.
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Appendix: Draft Privacy Protection Board Legislation
A bill to establish a Privacy Protection Board, and for other
purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
Section 1. Short Title.
This Act may be cited as the "Privacy Protection Board Act."
Section 2. Privacy Protection Board.
(a) Establishment of Board.
(1) There is established as an independent agency of the
executive branch of the Government the Privacy Protection Board.
(b)(1) The Board shall be composed of 5 members who shall be
appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, from among members of the public at large who are well
qualified for service on the Board by reason of their knowledge and
expertise in any of the following areas: civil rights and liberties, law,
social sciences, information policy, communications, technology,
business, and state and local government. Not more than 3 of the
members of the Board shall be adherents of the same political party.
(2) One member of the Board shall be designated Chairman by
the President.
(3) The Chairman shall preside at all meetings of the Board, but
the Chairman may designate another member as an acting Chairman
who may preside in the absence of the Chairman. A quorum for the
transaction of business shall consist of at least 3 members present,
except that one member may conduct hearings and take testimony if
authorized by the Board. Each member of the Board, including the
Chairman, shall have equal responsibility and authority in all
decisions and actions of the Board, shall have full access to all
information relating to the performance of the duties and
responsibilities of the Board, and shall have one vote. Action of the
Board shall be determined by a majority vote of the members
present. The Chairman (or Acting Chairman) shall see to the faithful
execution of the policies and decisions of the Board, and shall report
thereon to the Board from time to time or as the Board may direct.
(4) Members of the Board shall serve for terms of 5 years,
except that a member may continue to serve until a successor takes
office. Members shall be eligible for reappointment for a single
additional term. Vacancies in the membership of the Board shall be
filled in the same manner in which the original appointment was
made.
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(5) Vacancies in the membership of the Board, as long as there
are 3 members in office, shall not impair the power of the Board to
execute the functions and powers of the Board.
(6) The members of the Board shall not engage in any other
employment during their tenure as members of the Board.
(7)(A) Whenever the Board submits any budget estimate or
request to the President or Office of Management and Budget, it shall
concurrently transmit a copy of that request to the Congress.
(B) Whenever the Board submits any legislative
recommendations, or testimony, or comments on legislation to the
President or Office of Management and Budget, it shall concurrently
transmit a copy thereof to the Congress. No officer or agency of the
United States shall have any authority to require the Board to submit
its legislative recommendations, testimony, or comments on
legislation, to any office or agency of the United States for approval,
comments, or review, prior to the submission of the
recommendations, testimony, or comments to the Congress.
(c) Personnel of the Board.
(1)(A) The Board shall appoint an Executive Director and a
General Counsel who shall perform such duties as the Board may
determine. The appointments may be made without regard to the
provisions of Title 5 of the United States Code.
(B) The Executive Director and the General Counsel shall
each be paid at a rate not to exceed the rate of basic pay for level V of
the Executive Schedule.
(2) The Board is authorized to appoint and fix the
compensation of not more than 100 officers and employees (or the
full-time equivalent thereof), and to prescribe their functions and
duties.
(3) The Board may obtain the services of experts and
consultants in accordance with the provisions of Section 3109 of Title
5 of the United States Code.
(d) Functions of the Board.
(1) The Board shall:
(A) promote the adoption and implementation throughout the
United States of protections for personal privacy and of principles of
Fair Information Practices, including the principles of collection
limitation, data quality, purpose specification, use limitation, security
safeguards, openness, individual participation, and accountability;
(B) develop model guidelines, regulations, and routine uses for
use by federal agencies in implementing the provisions of Section
552a of Title 5 of the United States Code;
(C) develop guidelines for use by federal, state, and local
agencies in implementation the provisions of Section 7 of the Privacy
Act, Public Law 93-579;
(D) publish on a regular basis on the Internet and, as
appropriate:
(i) a guide to the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. § 552a) for use
by record managers;
(ii) a guide to the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. § 552a), the
Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552), and other laws relating
to privacy of federal agency records, for use by record subjects;
(iii) a guide to federal, state, and other relevant privacy laws
for use by records subjects and by record managers; and
(iv) a compilation of agency system of record notices, including
an index and other finding aids.
(E)(i) not later than two years after its first meeting, make
detailed recommendations to the Congress for amending the Privacy
Act of 1974, for improving coordination between the Privacy Act of
1974 and the Freedom of Information Act; and
(ii) from time to time, make recommendations to the Congress
and to the states for passage of or amendments to laws affecting
privacy.
(2) The Board may:
(A) issue advisory opinions with respect to Section 552a of
Title 5 of the United States Code, at the request of a federal agency, a
data integrity board of an agency, a court, the Congress, or any
person;
(B) investigate compliance with Section 552a of Title 5 of the
United States Code, and report on any violation of any provision
thereof (or of any regulation promulgated under the section) to an
agency, the President, the Attorney General, or to the Congress;
(C) file comments with the Office of Management and Budget
and with any agency on any proposal (i) to amend Section 552a of
Title 5 of the United States Code, or any regulation promulgated
under the section; (ii) to create or modify a system of records; (iii) to
establish or change an exemption for a system of records; or (iv) to
establish or alter routine uses of a system of records;
(D) request an agency to stay (i) the establishment or revision
of a system of records, (ii) a routine use, (iii) an exemption, or (iv) a
regulation promulgated under Section 552a of Title 5 of the United
States Code;
(E) review federal, state, and local laws, executive orders,
regulations, directives, and judicial decisions and report on the extent
to which they are consistent with privacy rights and standards and
with fair information practices;
(F) at the request of a state or local government or federal
agency, provide assistance on matters relating to privacy;
(G) comment on the implications for privacy of proposed
federal, state, or local statutes, regulations, or procedures;
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(H) propose legislation on privacy;
(I) accept and investigate complaints about violations of
privacy rights and interests;
(J) participate in any formal or informal federal administrative
proceeding or process where, in the judgment of the Board, the action
being considered would have a material effect on privacy, either as a
result of direct government action or as a result of government
regulation of others;
(K) petition a federal agency to take action on matter affecting
privacy rights and interests;
(L) comment on any action or proposal of any federal, state, or
local action, activity, or plan that affects privacy rights and interests;
and
(M) comment on any action, proposal, or legislation of any
foreign country or international organization that affects privacy
rights and interests;
(3) In addition, the Board may:
(A) conduct, assist, or support research, studies, public opinion
polls, and investigations on the collection, maintenance, use, or
dissemination of personal information; the implications for privacy
rights and interests of computer, network, communications,
surveillance, and other technologies; and any other matter relating to
privacy rights and interests;
(B) comment on or assist in the development or
implementation of policies designed to provide for the protection of
personal information maintained by private sector record keepers,
including for profit and non profit organizations;
(C) assist United States companies and organizations doing
business abroad to respond to foreign privacy laws and agencies;
(D) assist in the coordination of United States privacy laws,
policies, and practices with the data protection laws, policies, and
practices of foreign countries;
(E) accept and investigate inquiries and complaints from
foreign governments with respect to privacy rights and interests;
(F) cooperate and consult with privacy agencies of foreign
government; and
(G) sponsor and support conferences and meetings on privacy
rights and interests.
(e) Confidentiality of Information.
(1) Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the
executive branch of the Government, including each independent
agency, shall furnish to the Board, upon request made by the
Chairman, any data, reports, and other information as the Board
deems necessary to carry out its functions under this Act.
(2) In carrying out its functions and exercising its powers under
this Act, the Board may accept from any federal agency or other
person any identifiable personal data if the data is necessary to carry
out its powers and functions. In any case in which the Board accepts
any information, it shall provide appropriate safeguards to insure that
the confidentiality of the information is maintained and that upon
completion of the purpose for which the information is required, the
information is destroyed or returned to the agency or person from
which it is obtained, as appropriate.
(3) The Board shall maintain the same level of confidentiality
for a record made available under this section as is required of the
head of the agency from which it is obtained. Officers and employees
of the Board are subject to the same statutory penalties for
unauthorized disclosure or use as officers or employees of the agency
from which the information is obtained.
(f) Powers of the Board.
(1)(A) The Board may, in carrying out its functions under this
Act, conduct inspections, sit and act at times and places, hold
hearings, take testimony, require by subpoena the attendance of
witnesses and the production of books, records, papers,
correspondence, and documents, administer oaths, have printing and
binding done, and make expenditures as the Board deems advisable.
A subpoena shall be issued only upon an affirmative vote of a
majority of all members of the Board. Subpoenas shall be issued
under the signature of the Chairman or any member of the Board
designated by the Board and shall be served by any person designated
by the Chairman or any designated member. Any member of the
Board may administer oaths or affirmations to witnesses appearing
before the Board.
(B) In case of disobedience to a subpoena issued under
subparagraph (A) of this subsection, the Board may invoke the aid of
any district court of the United States in requiring compliance with
the subpoena. Any district court of the United States within thejurisdiction where the person is found or transacts business may, in
case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena issued by the Board,
issue an order requiring the person to appear and testify, to produce
books, record, papers, correspondence, and documents. Any failure
to obey the order of the court shall be punished by the court as a
contempt thereof.
(C) Appearances by the Board under this Act shall be in its
own name. The Board shall be represented by attorneys designated
by it.
(2) The Board may delegate any of its functions to officers and
employees of the Board as the Board may designate and may
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authorize successive redelegations of the functions as it may deem
desirable.
(3) In order to carry out the provisions of this Act, the Board
may:
(A) adopt, amend, and repeal rules and regulations governing
the manner of its operations, organization, and personnel;
(B) enter into contracts or other arrangements with any state
or local government, any agency or department of the United States,
or with any person, firm, association, or corporation, and the contract,
other arrangements, or modifications thereof, may be entered into
without legal consideration, without performance or other bonds, and
without regard to Section 3709 of the Revised Statutes (41 U.S.C. § 5)
(C) make advance, progress, and other payments as the Board
considers necessary under this Act without regard to the provisions of
31 U.S.C. §§ 3324(a), (b);
(D) establish advisory committees in accordance with the
Federal Advisory Committee Act;
(E) accept unconditional gifts or donations of services, money,
or property, real, personal, or mixed, tangible or intangible;
(F) use, with their consent, the services, equipment, personnel,
and facilities of federal and other agencies with or without
reimbursement, and on a similar basis cooperate with other public
and private agencies and instrumentalities in the use of services,
equipment, and facilities. Each department and agency of the federal
government shall cooperate fully with the Board in making its
services, equipment, personnel, and facilities available to the Board;
and
(G) take any other action as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions of this Act.
(g) Reports and Information.
(1) The Board shall, from time to time, and in an annual report,
report to the President and the Congress on its activities in carrying
out the provisions of this Act.
(2) The Board shall undertake whatever efforts it may
determine to be necessary or appropriate to inform and educate the
public, organizations that maintain personal information, or others of
privacy rights, interests, and responsibilities.
Section 3. Conforming Amendments
(a) Conforming Amendment to the Privacy Act of 1974.-
Section 552a of Title 5 of the United States Code, is amended:
(1) by striking "or" at the end of subsection (b)(11), by striking
the period at the end of subsection (b)(12) and inserting in lieu
thereof: "; or", and by inserting after the subsection the following:
"(13) to the Privacy Protection Board."
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(2) by inserting "the Privacy Protection Board," after "of the
Senate," in subsection (r).
(b) Conforming Amendment to Executive Schedule.-Section
5314 of Title 5 of the United States Code, is amended by adding at
the end thereof the following new paragraph:
"Members, Privacy Protection Board (5)."
Section 4. Authorization of Appropriations
There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be
necessary to carry out this Act.
